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In a dynamic stochastic monopoly union model we show that ﬁring costs have a
small and ambiguous impact on the level of employment if the union precommits to
future wages. Further, in comparison with the commitment equilibrium and for very
general union preferences, the no-commitment equilibrium exhibits higher wages and
a lower employment level.
Since commitment-like equilibria are more likely in cooperative bargain environ-
ments, these results suggest that, coeteris paribus, the interaction between employ-
ment protection and the quality of industrial relations reduces unemployment. We
provide evidence on OECD countries which is consistent with this predictions.
Keywords: Firing Costs, Unemployment, Industrial Relations
Jel-Code: J23, J51, J631 Introduction
In spite of the large amount of research devoted to the consequences of employment pro-
tection, the issue still draws the attention of the economic profession. Some results are
by now conclusive. There are no doubts, for instance, that employment protection com-
presses job market ﬂows and increases long term unemployment. Other results, however,
are controversial. Notably, theoretical as well as empirical works do not seem to oﬀer a
clear perspective on the relationship between protection and the rate of aggregate unem-
ployment.
In this paper we attempt to shed some light on the unemployment impact of protection
by means of a theoretical and empirical investigation which emphasises the roles of wage
bargaining and industrial relations.
The idea that the impact of protection in wage bargaining is essential to understand
the impact on unemployment arises from the literature.
In a famous early paper, Lazear (1990) clariﬁes that what matters for severance pay-
ments to aﬀect employment is whether they increase the overall cost of labour. It follows
that these transfers reduce employment only to the extent they are not undone through
lower bargained wages at entry.
In contrast with Lazear, Lindbek and Snower (1988) and Bertola and Bentolila (1990)
focus on those components of protection that can be described as pure ﬁring taxes. In
spite of this diﬀerence, however, the impact of ﬁring provisions in wage bargaining con-
tinues to be crucial. In Lindbeck and Snower, ﬁring taxes contribute to the bargaining
strength of insiders in wage negotiations and, as a consequence, ﬁrm hire less workers. In
Bertola and Bentolila, instead, ﬁring taxes are not allowed to aﬀect wages. As a result,
ﬁring provisions compress job creation and destruction but the net impact on average
employment is inherently uncertain.
Liumqvist (2002) clariﬁes that the nexus between wage bargaining and the employment
impact of ﬁring taxes carries over to general equilibrium models with search and matching.
In these models, whether ﬁring taxes increase equilibrium unemployment depends crucially
on whether they aﬀect the split of match surplus. If ﬁring taxes are allowed to change the
split of match surplus in favour of workers, which is akin to assume that taxes contribute
1to their bargaining strength, unemployment unambiguously increases (Saint-Paul, 1995).
By contrast, if ﬁring taxes are not allowed to aﬀect the split of match surplus, which
is akin to assuming no impact in wage bargaining, unemployment does not display any
predictable variation following an increase in protection. More precisely, the sign of the
variation depends on non-core elements of the model such as the assumptions regarding
the dynamics of match productivity (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, and Burda,1992)1.
Given that wages represent the main channel that conveys the link between employ-
ment protection and unemployment, a natural question to ask is under what conditions
higher ﬁring costs lead to higher bargained wages. In this paper, we take the view that
the relationship between ﬁring costs and wages depends on whether wage setters can enter
long-term commitments or, more concretely, on whether the industrial relations environ-
ment favours long-term cooperative interactions between workers and ﬁrms. The reason
lies in a classical hold-up problem. Firing costs strengthen the bargain power of employed
workers and allow rent extraction in the form of higher wages. Firms, in turn, anticipate
the opportunistic behaviour of workers and reduce labour demand during business expan-
sions. It follows that workers can boost the number of recruits during business expansions
only if they are able to commit ex-ante to future wage moderation. Within this perspec-
tive, cooperative industrial relations are expected to oﬀer an environment which permits
long term commitments through informal agreements. Enforcement of these agreements is
provided by the costs associated to interrupting the cooperation. By contrast, adversarial
relationships represent the natural backstage for the opportunistic behaviour which lies
at the core of the hold-up problem. Thus, in our view, the quality of industrial relations
plays a role in determining the overall wage and employment impact of ﬁring restrictions.
The model at the core of the paper borrows from the setting of Bertola (1990) but
substitutes exogenously ﬁxed wages with endogenous wage-setting operated by a union in
an industry with atomistic ﬁrms. The assumption of a monopolistic union facing many
competitive ﬁrms simpliﬁes the analysis and, for this reason, is also common to many
previous contributions2. Nevertheless, in the real world unions do not possess unlimited
1Of course, the contributions that have been cited represent only a small part of a large body of
literature. A non-exaustive list would also include Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Bentolila and Saint-
Paul (1994), Millard and Mortensen (1994), Bertola and Rogerson (1997), Pissarides (2000).
2If one browse within the set of papers cited in this introduction, the monopoly union assumption has
2bargaining power in wage negotiations so that the assumption should be used only in
contexts where results do not hinge on the degree of union power. We believe that this is
the case in the present study. After all, what is relevant for the substantive implications
o ft h em o d e li st h ef a c tt h a tt h eu n i o np o s s e s s e ssome power in wage negotiation and that
ﬁring taxes interact with this power by oﬀering a support for rent extraction.
In addition to endogenous wages, the model exhibits two other distinctive features,
a stochastic dynamic environment and ﬁring taxes that are proportional to the number
of layoﬀs. We believe that these ingredients are useful to capture the essential traits of
regulated labour markets. The reasons are the following. First, ﬁring restrictions are
commonly regarded in the world of businesses to be detrimental to the ability of ﬁrms to
cope with unforeseen contingencies. This view suggests the use of a stochastic dynamic
environment as a natural setting for the investigation. Second, in almost all countries, em-
ployment protection legislation (EPL) commands per-worker provisions (Emerson, 1988;
OECD, 1999). This fact obviously translates into taxes that are proportional to the size
of workforce adjustments. Furthermore, the empirical literature based on micro-level data
appears to be supportive of linear speciﬁcations as opposed to convex speciﬁcations. Work-
force adjustments of single ﬁrms are discrete and infrequent instead of being small and
continuous (Hamermesh,1989; Burda, 1991).
We analyse this setting both under union commitment and no-commitment on future
wages and ﬁnd results that can be summarised as follows. First, in the equilibrium under
commitment, ﬁring restrictions reduce workforce turnover but the impact on employment
and wages turns out to be ambiguous. Second, in the equilibrium under no-commitment,
ﬁring restrictions exert an additional positive impact on wages that is absent under com-
mitment, this impact relates to the hold-up problem outlined above. Furthermore, the
impact depends on the curvature of the union objective function in the sense that it is
stronger if workers become more averse to variations in the wage ﬂow. Thus, in comparison
with the commitment case and for a reasonable degree of risk aversion, ﬁring restrictions
lead to higher wages and lower employment levels.
Using the conjecture that long-term commitments overlap with the notion of coopera-
been used by Kennan (1988) , Modesto and Thomas (2001) and Garibaldi and Violante (2005).
3tive industrial relations, we test these results by means of OECD data for unemployment
and a set of unemployment determinants together with World Economic Forum (WEF)
information on the quality of industrial relations in diﬀerent countries. Results turn out
to be in line with theoretical predictions. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that EPL reduces
unemployment in countries featuring cooperative industrial relations but turns out to be
neutral in adversarial contexts.
Related literature
Close to the present paper are the works of Kennan (1988) and Modesto and Thomas
(2001). Both contributions exhibit endogenous wage setting, a monopoly union and a
sector of many competitive ﬁrms subject to workforce adjustment costs. These papers,
however, depart from the linear cost tradition and build on the analytically friendly but
unrealistic assumption of quadratic symmetric costs. Their main concern is to study
connections between the characteristics of the wage bargaining process and the speed of
adjustment of employment to its long run equilibrium level. The model in Modesto and
Thomas is also non-stochastic so that adjustments are interpreted as following from a
once-and-for-all perturbation. Finally, in Modesto and Thomas the equilibrium under
commitment coincides with the one under no-commitment if ﬁring costs are linear proving
that the quadratic cost assumption is crucial for their results.
Since we focus on an interaction between Epl and the institutional environment of wage
bargaining a contribution which we regard close in spirit to the present work is the paper
by Garibaldi and Violante (2005). These show that a further relevant interaction is the one
between Epl and the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining. In their setting, ﬁring
costs are modeled as transfers so that centralisation matters in that it prevents full undoing
of these transfers. In spite of the diﬀerence between the two settings, however, their point
is similar to the one made in the present paper. To understand the employment impact
of Epl one needs to uncover the interplay between ﬁring provisions and the characteristics
of the bargaining environment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical environment.
In sections 3 and 4 the ﬁrms-union interaction is studied respectively with and without a
commitment on wages. In section 5 we analyse the interaction between ﬁring costs and the
4ability to commit while in section 6 we check whether theoretical results are empirically
consistent. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2M o d e l
2.1 Assumptions
A single wage-setting union and a unit mass of identical competitive ﬁrms operate in the
same industry. Business conditions, i.e. demand and productivity conditions, are common
to all ﬁrms and are subject to stochastic changes. Firms maximise the discounted cash
ﬂow by adapting their workforce to changing business and wage conditions. In making
these decisions, however, they are obliged to pay to a third party a ﬁring cost for any
dismissed worker. Production is realised through a labour-only technology, the current
cash ﬂow cf is given by the diﬀerence between current revenues and labour costs:
cf(αt,w t,l t−1,l t)=( αt −
d
2
lt)lt − wtlt − Ilt≤lt−1F (lt−1 − lt)
Revenues (αt − d
2lt)lt depend on the level of ﬁrm’s employment lt a n do nt h es h i f t e rαt
which indexes business conditions during period t. The value of the shifter may change
from period t to period t + 1. We assume that the motion is governed by a two-states
Markov process, α cycles between an high value αg and a low value αb (< αg)w i t ha
constant per-period transition probability q (< 1). Labour costs are given by the wage bill
wtlt plus total ﬁring costs. F represents the ﬁring cost for a single dismissed worker while
Ilt≤lt−1 (lt−1 − lt) gives the total mass of dismissed workers. The dummy Ilt≤lt−1 switches
from 1 to 0 if current employment becomes higher than past employment.
The union maximizes a discounted utility ﬂow by adopting an optimal wage policy
(monopoly union), per-period utility U(wt,L t) depends on the wage level wt and on ag-
gregate employment Lt.
5We assume that the union is utilitarian:3
U(wt,L t)=Ltv(wt)+( m − Lt)v(e w)( 1 )
In this expression, m represents union membership, which we assume to be ﬁxed, and
(m − Lt) the number of unemployed members. The utility of each member v depends on
the union wage wt for those who happen to be employed and on the “alternative” exogenous
wage e w for the unemployed. We assume that v belongs to the CARA or DARA families, i.e.
the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion −v00/v0 is either constant or decreasing with respect
to the wage. We exclude functions displaying increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) on
the basis of the argument that they imply implausible risk behaviour.4 Belonging to the
CARA or DARA families also implies that v is concave with a positive third derivative.
2.2 The employment policy
In any period ﬁrms choose the level of employment after having observed the current state
of business conditions and the current wage. Both variables are regarded to be exogenous
by any (small) ﬁrm. The optimal employment sequence or, equivalently, the optimal hiring
and ﬁring sequence, solves the Bellman problem
V (αt,w t,l t−1)=m a x
lt
cf(αt,w t,l t−1,l t)+ 1
1+r Et [V (αt+1,w t+1,l t)]
The value of the ﬁrm is given by the current cash ﬂow plus the expected discounted
continuation value. In addition to current wages and business conditions the value also
depends on lagged employment due to the presence of ﬁring costs.
To characterise the employment policy we introduce the notion of the shadow value
of labour. We deﬁne the shadow value S(αt,w t,l t) as the value accruing to the ﬁrm from
a worker permanently added to its workforce. This value is computed along the optimal
policy. Thus, the shadow value corresponds to the increase in V due to a marginal upward
3The utilitarian objective function has been widely used in the union literature. The obvious reference
is Oswald (1985).
4With IARA preferences, low wage individuals are less averse to absolute risk than high wage individuals.
6shift in the employment path {l−1,l t.....}:
S(αt,w t,l t)=αt − dl t − wt +
1
1+r
Et [S(αt+1,w t+1,l t+1)] (2)
The shadow value is given by a recursive relationship since it equals the current net
marginal revenue of labour plus the expected discounted next period shadow value. Due to
the linearity of ﬁring costs, for a given current employment lt, S(αt,w t,l t) is unrelated to
lagged employment lt−1.I nt h i ss e n s eS is a pure forward looking variable corresponding








Et (αt+j − dl t+j − wt+j)( 3 )
Equation 3 has been obtained by running forward the recursive expression in 2 and by
conjecturing asymptotic boundedness for the shadow value. This conjecture turns out to
be correct along the optimal employment path.
Since laying oﬀ a single worker costs F while a recruit costs nothing, ﬁrms choose
inaction when the shadow value under inaction - i.e. S(αt,w t,l t−1) - lies within the
interval [−F,0]. In this case, in fact, neither hiring nor ﬁring yield a net positive reward.
Workforce adjustments occur only when S(αt,w t,l t−1) falls outside the inaction interval
[−F,0]. If S(αt,w t,l t−1) > 0 optimality requires recruiting new workers. Further, hiring
must take place up to the point the marginal recruit becomes valueless or, more formally,
up to the point the shadow value is brought to the upper boundary of the inaction interval,
i.e. S(αt,w t,l t)=0i flt >l t−1. On the other hand, if S(αt,w t,l t−1) < −F optimality
requires a reduction in workforce. In particular, this reduction must be such that ﬁring an
extra worker entails no net positive value, this happens when the shadow value is brought
to the lower boundary of the inaction interval, i.e. S(αt,w t,l t)=−F if lt <l t−1.T h i s
conﬁrms the conjecture that the shadow value is bounded along the optimal policy.
We conclude this section with a formal description of the optimal employment policy
which will turn useful when we analyse union behaviour. For this purpose, we deﬁne
two threshold levels for wt which serve to specify whether the current wage triggers hiring,
ﬁring or inaction. Thus, let w(αt,l t−1)a n dw(αt,l t−1) represent respectively the maximum
7and the minimum wage consistent with inaction, these thresholds are deﬁned as follows:
w(αt,l t−1)=αt − dl t−1 +
1
1+r
Et [S(αt+1,w t+1,l t+1)] + F (4)
w(αt,l t−1) ≡ w(αt,l t−1) − F (5)
These equations imply that if the current wage wt is equal to w then the shadow value
under inaction S(αt,w t,l t−1)i se q u a lt o−F whereas if the current wage is equal to w
the shadow value is nil. Thus, if the current wage lies inside the interval [w, w] ﬁrms
choose inaction. Notice also that the thresholds depend upon the expected next period
shadow value and, through this channel, upon expected future wage rates. This means
that higher future wages reduce both w and w and make ﬁring a more likely occurrence
for any given current wage wt. Reversing the perspective, lower expected future wages
allow the union to charge higher current wages without incurring into a reduction in the
number of employed workers.
Using the wage thresholds we can express the optimal employment policy as follows:
Iwt≤w(αt,lt−1)S(αt,w t,l t)=0 ( 6 )
Iwt≥w(αt,lt−1) [S(αt,w t,l t)+F]=0 ( 7 )
Iw(αt,lt−1)≤wt≤w(αt,lt−1)(lt−1 − lt)=0 ( 8 )
In these equations, the dummy I() is equal to 1 when the attached condition is true
a n dt o0o t h e r w i s e .T h eﬁrst equation describes ﬁrm behaviour when the current wage is
set equal or below w.I fwt = w the shadow value S is equal to zero by deﬁnition whereas,
if wt <w , ﬁrms increase employment so as to reset S to zero. The second and the third
equations have similar interpretations.
82.3 The wage policy
In the ﬁrst part of this section we analyse the strategy of the union under the assumption
that it can precommit to a particular wage policy. At the end of the section we deal with
the no-commitment case.
2.3.1 The wage policy under commitment
Let ht =( α0,α1,....αt) represent the history of exogenous business conditions from period
0u pt op e r i o dt and Ht the set of all possible vectors ht, we assume that the union commits
by announcing a sequence of history contingent wages wt(ht),t=0 ,1.., for all ht ∈ Ht.
The announcement is made at the beginning of period 0 and, therefore, is conditioned on
the observation of current business conditions α0 and lagged aggregate employment L−1.
The union chooses the wage sequence so as to maximise the discounted utility ﬂow under
the constraints posed by the employment decisions of ﬁrms. Formally, this amounts to










t St + λtIF
t (St + F)+γtII
t (Lt−1 − Lt)
¤¾
(9)
Multipliers [σt,λt,γt] have been used to embed into the program the constraints 6-
8 that follow from the employment policy of ﬁrms. For ease of notation, S(αt,w t,L t)




t [H: hiring, F: ﬁring, I: inaction]. Since the mass of ﬁrms
has a unit measure, aggregation implies lt = Lt.T h u s ,lt needs to be substituted with Lt
when one refers to the constraints arising from the aggregate employment policy.
The problem in 9 can not be solved through dynamic programming since the shadow







depend upon (the expected value of) future wages.
Equation 3 illustrates the forward nature of St while equations 4 and 5 illustrate the
forward nature of the wage thresholds w and w which, in turn, determine the dummy
vector. Intuitively, future wages aﬀect the current union welfare by determining the current
value for ﬁrms of an extra worker added to the workforce. This, in turn, determines
9whether ﬁrms ﬁre, hire or stay inactive at current time and, in the ﬁrst two cases, how
many workers are involved in the adjustment.
The fact that future wages aﬀect current employment decisions causes the optimal
policy to be time inconsistent. The union has an incentive to announce low future wages
and then to renege on the announcement. On technical grounds, program 9 is non-recursive
and can not be solved with the Bellman format. For this reason, we transform the program
and make it recursive by adopting the method of Marcet and Marimon (1992). This
method consists of introducing ﬁctitious state variables - Abel-variables in the words of
Liumqvist and Sargent (2004, chap 15) - which force the planner to implement the ex-ante
optimal policy while behaving in time consistent fashion.
Let Σ represent the Abel-variable associated to S in constraint 6 and Λ the one asso-
ciated to S in constraint 7, the deﬁnition of these variables is as follows5:
Σt = Σt−1 + σtIH
t Λt = Λt−1 + λtIF
t Σ0 = Λ0 =0 ( 1 0 )
Let Yt =( αt,L t−1,Σt−1,Λt−1) represent the vector of state variables at time t and W(Yt)







are a function only of the current state Yt. Under this conjecture, the law of
motion in 10 implies that W(Yt) follows the Bellman recursion
W(Yt)= m a x
{wt,L t, σt, λt, γt}
U(wt,L t)+( Σt + Λt)(αt − dLt − wt)+
(11)
+λtIF
t F + γtII




As a result of recursivity, the solution of the program is represented by a set of time
5Note that S is not the only forward looking variable in the program. As observed in the text, the dum-
mies also depend on the expectation over future wage and employment levels. However, when evaluating
alternative wage policies, changes in these dummies do not aﬀect the discounted welfare of the union. The
reason is straightforward. Whenever a dummy is ”active” the attached multiplier is nil since it represents
the relevant ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrms. Thus, if a dummy moves between zero and one as a consequence
of a small change in the wage policy there in no impact on the discounted summation in 9.
10invariant functions of Yt:
ft = f(Yt) f = w,L,σ,λ,γ (12)
For given initial conditions Y0 =[ αo, Lt−1, 0, 0], the evolution of the state vector Yt is
governed by these policy functions and by the stochastic exogenous motion of business
conditions α. This implies that for any history ht =( α0,α1,....αt) one can compute the
corresponding state vector Yt by applying functions f(.) recursively. More formally, these
policy functions introduce a correspondence from the set of history vectors Ht to the set
of state vectors {Yt}. Thus, for any given history ht the optimal wage under commitment
wt(ht) is equal to the time invariant function w(.) computed for the corresponding state
vector Yt.







being only dependent on the current state Yt. In fact, given the current state Yt,p o l i c y
functions f(.) map probabilities over the future evolution of the business index αt into
probabilities over future states Yt. This means that Yt is the only determinant of expec-
tations concerning future wage and employment levels. Thus, Yt is the only determinant
of current wage thresholds, wt and wt, and of the current dummies.
2.3.2 The wage policy under no-commitment
In the absence of a commitment wages are chosen period by period. This prevents the
union from implementing the policy that is optimal as of the beginning of the game.
Technically, behaving in a time-consistent not optimal fashion amounts to setting Σt−1
and Λt−1 equal to zero at the beginning of any period t so that the state vector collapses
from (αt,L t−1,Σt−1,Λt−1)t o( αt,L t−1). For this reason, the wage and employment policies
c a nb es u m m a r i s e da sf o l l o w s :
wt = w(αt,L t−1,0,0) ≡ e w(αt,L t−1)( 1 3 )
Lt = L(αt,L t−1,0,0) ≡ e L(αt,L t−1)( 1 4 )
113 Wages and employment under commitment
3.1 The equilibrium under commitment
In this section we deﬁne the equilibrium under commitment and characterise the wage
and the employment paths along such an equilibrium. The treatment is quite general as
it does not relate to the particular law of motion which governs the exogenous dynamics
of α. In the next subsection, we show how employment and wages evolve if α follows the
two-states Markov process of good and bad business conditions.
Deﬁnition A commitment equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
i) Optimal ﬁrm behaviour:a n yﬁrm sets employment lt period by period according to
equations 6-8;
ii) Optimal union behaviour: the union sets wages by precommitting at time 0 to the
sequence wt(ht)=w(Yt), where Yt is the state vector corresponding to ht;
iii) Aggregation: aggregate employment is the sum of employment in all ﬁrms: lt = Lt.
On the basis of this deﬁnition, it is straightforward to see that the equilibrium path
for wages and employment results from functions wt = w(Yt)a n dLt = L(Yt). These,
in fact, can be interpreted as mutual best responses since w(Yt) is, by construction, the
optimal commitment policy face to ﬁrms employment decisions whereas L(Yt) derives from
a program which is constrained by the optimal conditions 6-8.
In the appendix, we solve the program 11 and provide some formal statements which
s e r v et oc h a r a c t e r i s et h ew(Yt)a n dL(Yt) sequences. We reach two main results:
Result 1: Under commitment, if employment is constant from one period to the other,
wages are also constant (lemma 1).
Result 2: Under commitment, if business conditions do not change from one period
to the other - i.e. αt = αt−1 - then employment and, by result 1, wages do not change.
(proposition A1).
Result 1 is explained as follows. The objective function of the union is concave with
respect to the wage. Thus, if employment is constant along a portion of the equilibrium
path, the union strictly prefers to commit to a sequence of constant wages along this
portion rather than to equivalent sequences with changing wages. For equivalent sequences
12we mean wage sequences with the same expected discounted value and that bring forth,
as a consequence, the same employment level.
Result 2 is due to the fact that the cost of adjusting employment is linear not con-
vex. Therefore, providing ﬁrms decide to adapt employment to new business and wage
conditions, there is no gain for them to delay the adjustment or spread the adjustment
over many periods. Thus, considering that wages change only if employment does (result
1), employment and wages change only at business turns - if they change at all - but not
within a spell of constant business conditions.
3.2 Wages and employment
While the analysis conducted so far holds for any process driving business conditions
in this section we restrict our attention to the simple stochastic cycle of good and bad
conditions. Recall that results 1 and 2 imply that employment and wages can only change
at business turns but not within a spell of constant business conditions. Furthermore,
it is also possible that employment and wage do not change at all as a consequence of
ﬁring costs that are prohibitively large. However, we regard this case as implausible
from an empirical point of view. After all, even in countries with very strict employment
protection workforce responds to idiosyncratic ﬁrms conditions (OECD, 1994). Thus, in
the remainder of this section we focus on an equilibrium which exhibits hiring at the
beginning of good spells and ﬁring at the beginning of bad spells6.W e ﬁrst show how
to compute wage and employment levels along such an equilibrium and then study under
what parameter restrictions positive workforce adjustments take place. Towards the end
of the section we discuss the employment impact of ﬁring costs.
Let us deﬁne with Lc
g and wc
g [c: committment] the employment and wage levels along
a good spell and with Lc
b and wc





b] can be formally computed from program 11 we opt for a
more intuitive derivation by noticing that positive workforce adjustments imply that the
program of the union is separable across good and bad spells. In other words, when
6Hiring at the beginning of bad spells (as a consequence of very low wages) and ﬁring at the beginning
of good spells (as a consequence of very high wage s )c a nn o tb ep a r to fa ne quilibrium. Wages and
employment are normal goods for the union (see the discussion below), thus the two variables increase
(decrease) jointly when demand conditions improve (deteriorate).
13choosing wc
g at the beginning of a good spell, the union knows that Lc
g has no impact on
its own returns once business conditions turn bad. This is because linear adjustment costs
and positive ﬁring imply that the subsequent choice on Lc
b by the ﬁrm sector only depends
upon wc
b but not on Lc
g.7 For analogous reasons, when choosing wc
b at the beginning of a
bad spell the union knows that Lc
b has no impact on the continuation value in case business
conditions turn good.
Since current employment does not aﬀect returns in subsequent spells, the union sets
t h ew a g es oa st om a x i m i s et h ed i s c o u n t e du t i l i t yﬂow only over the current spell. Fur-
thermore, as employment and wages are constant within spells, this boils down to solving





































In these programs, labour demands 16 and 18 have been obtained from equation 2
after substituting the relevant values of S. Constant employment and wages within spells
lead to constant values of S.T h u s ,S is equal to 0 at all times within good spells and to
−F at all times within bad spells.8
Labour demands 16 and 18 clarify under what conditions positive hiring and ﬁring arise
7Of course, L
c
g h a sn oi m p a c to nu n i o nr e t u r n sb u th a sa ni m p a c to nﬁrms returns if business conditions
turn bad since an higher level L
c
g means more dismissals and higher dismissal costs.
8According to these programs, the dynamic equilibrium under commitment results from a simple col-
lection of purely static equilibria. The similarity with the static case, however, should not be interpreted
literally. For, in a static context, the position of labour demand is exhogenous whereas, in the present
setting, the position of labour demand is endogenously determined by the wage policy to which the union
has committed.
14in equilibrium. Due to the strict convexity of indiﬀerence curves generated by U(w,L)a n d
the linearity of labour demands, wages and employment are ”normal goods” for the union.
Thus, since positive adjustments require Lc
g >L c
b, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
positive adjustments (and for wc
g >w c
b)i st h a tl a b o u rd e m a n di ng o o dt i m e sl i e sa b o v e
labour demand in bad times. By inspecting demand schedules this amounts to impose the
following restriction on parameters:




Intuitively, positive adjustments arise if ﬁring costs are suﬃciently low and/or the
change in business conditions suﬃciently large. Further, notice that ﬁring costs enter the
inequality in combination with the transition rate q. An higher transition probability
makes business spells less durable and, as a consequence, reduces incentives to workforce
adjustments. Thus, for given ﬁring costs, positive adjustments tend to arise when q is
small.
Having characterised the determination of employment and wages we now focus on the
impact of ﬁring costs on these variables.
W eb e g i nw i t ht h ei m p a c to fﬁring costs on workforce turnover and wage ﬂuctuations.9
Observe that ﬁring costs shift labour demand up in bad times and down in good times. The
ﬁrst eﬀect is straightforward as it relates to the protection role of ﬁring costs. The second
is more subtle; for a given wage level, higher ﬁring costs reduce incentives to hiring in good
times as ﬁrms expect a reversal in business conditions in the future. Thus, more recruits
in good times mean more dismissals - and higher dismissal costs - when bad conditions
return. The consequences of these demand shifts in terms of employment and wage levels
are straightforward. Since employment and wages are normal goods for the union, a lower
labour demand in good times leads to lower levels of both variables. By contrast, an higher
labour demand in bad times leads to higher employment and wage levels. The upshot of
these eﬀe c t si st h a tﬁring costs tend to dampen wage and employment ﬂuctuations that
9The impact of ﬁring costs on turnover has been ﬁrstly analysed by Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) in models with exhogenous wages.
15take place at business turns.
Smaller employment ﬂuctuations, however, are not accompanied by clear-cut changes
in their average level. These changes, in fact, depend on a “discounting eﬀect”, governed
by r, and on a “curvature eﬀect” which is governed by the shape of union indiﬀerence
curves.
Discounting makes ﬁring costs more relevant for ﬁring decisions than for hiring deci-
sions. Formally, the multiplier of F in equation 16 is smaller in absolute size than the
one in equation 18 by an amount which increases with respect to r. As a consequence,
the upward shift of the schedule in bad times is more pronounced in comparison to the
downward shift in good times. This eﬀect - taken alone - obviously leads to an increase in
average employment following an increase in ﬁring costs.
In contrast with the positive discounting eﬀect the curvature eﬀect is negative,a t
least under standard speciﬁcations of the utility function of workers. The curvature eﬀect
is related to the shape of union indiﬀerence curves. In a stochastic cycle of low and
high demand schedules the shape of these curves clearly matters in determining average
employment. Setting aside the discounting eﬀect (r = 0), the position of labour demand
is determined by the ”adjusted” business index αg −qF i nt h eg o o ds t a t ea n db yαb +qF
in the bad state. Thus, higher ﬁring costs reduce the volatility of labour demand by
reducing the ﬂuctuations of the adjusted index while preserving the average value. It
follows that if union wages are concave with respect to the index, higher ﬁring costs tend
to increase the average wage and to decrease average employment. By contrast, if wages
are convex with respect to the index, higher ﬁring costs decrease the average wage and
increase employment.
The set of functions v(w)i nu s ei nt h i sp a p e r( D A R Aa n dC A R A )i st o og e n e r a l
to establish whether wages are convex or concave with respect to the adjusted index.
However, when we focus on the subset of DARA and CARA functions that are commonly
used in the union literature (exponential, isoelastic and logaritmic), we ﬁnd that wages
are concave so that, through the curvature eﬀect, ﬁring costs exert a negative impact on
employment. The details of this result are spelled out in the appendix (proposition A2).
Summing up, under commitment the impact of ﬁring costs on average employment is
16of uncertain sign. Firing costs increase employment through the discounting eﬀect but
decrease employment, under standard preferences, through the curvature eﬀect.
4 Wages and employment under no-commitment
4.1 The equilibrium under no-commitment
In this subsection we deﬁne the equilibrium under no commitment and characterise the
wage and employment sequence for any stochastic process governing the evolution of busi-
ness conditions. In the next subsection we focus on the Markov cycle of good and bad
states.
Deﬁnition A no-commitment equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
i) Optimal ﬁrm behaviour:a n yﬁrm sets employment lt period by period according to
equations 6-8;
ii) Optimal union behaviour: the union sets wages period by period by using the wage
setting function wt = e w(αt, Lt−1) (see equation 13).
iii) Aggregation: aggregate employment is the sum of employment in all ﬁrms: lt = Lt.
As for the commitment case, it is straightforward to see that, under no-commitment,
the equilibrium sequences of wages and employment are described by e w(αt,L t−1)a n d
e L(αt,L t−1). By construction, these functions represent mutual best responses in a game
where the current state encapsulates all relevant information for predicting future vari-
ables. The ensuing equilibrium can thus be termed as Markov subgame perfect (Maskin
and Tirole, 1988). In the appendix we formally study the characteristic of this equilibrium,
below we report the main results from this analysis.
Result 3: Under no-commitment, the union sets wt = wt - i.e. the maximum wage
consistent with employment inaction - if inaction prevails at time t (lemma 4).
Result 4: Under no-commitment, employment may change only at business turns but
not within a spell of constant business conditions (proposition A3).
Result 5: Under no-commitment, the wage is constant along spells that start with
dismissals. By contrast, along spells that start with recruits, the wage increases by F
17from the ﬁrst to the second period of the spell and remains at the higher level until the
end of the spell. (lemma 7).
Result 3 is crucial to understand the characteristics of the equilibrium. Intuitively,
the union does not possess the technology to commit to future low wages and, through
this way, to sustain current labour demand. As a consequence, ﬁrms expect that if there
are margins to increase wages in some future state without aﬀecting employment in that
state, then the union will fully exploit these margins. Indeed, in equilibrium, the union
does not gain from contradicting this expectation. There is no gain from not increasing
the wage up to w if this does not harm current employment nor the continuation value of
the game.
The motivation of employment inaction within spells (result 4) is similar to the one
given for the commitment equilibrium. With linear adjustment costs there is no reason
for ﬁrms not to adjust immediately to new business and wage conditions.
Finally, result 5 is closely related to the fact that the union pushes ﬁrms onto the
ﬁring barrier in all states where inaction prevails (result 3) and to the fact that inaction
prevails for sure within a spell of constant business conditions (result 4). This means that
the union sets wages so as to push ﬁrms onto the ﬁring barrier at all times during a spell
that starts with dismissals. Thus, along these spells the wage is constant. By contrast, for
spells that start with recruits, the shadow value lies, by deﬁnition, on the hiring barrier in
the ﬁrst period and on the ﬁring barrier thereafter. This shift in the shadow value is only
possible if the union increases the wage by F from the second period onwards. Intuitively,
after ﬁrms have recruited new workers, the union fully exploits the margins for a wage
increase that are guaranteed by ﬁring costs.
4.2 Wages and employment
Results 3-5 do not require any restriction on the stochastic process that drives exogenous
business conditions. In this section we return to the cycle of good and bad conditions and
analyse what are the implications of these results in such a simpliﬁed setting.
Result 4 suggests that in the two-states cycle the equilibrium may either exhibits
employment inaction at all times or positive employment adjustments but only at the
18beginning of business spells. Similar to the commitment case, whether inaction prevails
at all times depends on the size of ﬁring costs and on how large are the swings of business
condition. With reasonable ﬁring costs and/or suﬃciently large swings workforce adjusts
at positive rates. In this case, employment ﬂuctuates between an high level Lnc
g (nc : non
committment)a n dal o wl e v e lLnc
b . Furthermore, wages are set so as to keep the shadow
value on the ﬁring barrier at all times with the exception of the ﬁrst period of a good spell.
In particular, the wage is constant at level wnc
b along bad spells whereas, along good spell,
it is set at the level wnc
g in the ﬁrst period and at level wnc
g + F in the following periods
(result 5).
Similar to the commitment case, with positive adjustments the union program is sep-
arable across good and bad spells. This means that the union sets the wage in the ﬁrst
period of any spell so as to maximise the discounted per-period utility ﬂow only over the













































Labour demands 21 and 23 derive from equation 2 after substituting the relevant values
for the shadow value of labour. Observe that labour demand in bad spells is the same in
both equilibria. This is due to the fact that in both cases the shadow value S lies on the
ﬁring barrier at all times. Since the objective function of the union is also equal one may
conclude that, along bad spells, the two equilibria are similar. Intuitively, the inability
19of enter a wage commitment is irrelevant when workers opportunism is not an issue, i.e.
after workforce dismissals.
By contrast, the two equilibria diﬀer when it comes to good spells. First, labour
demand under no-commitment is lower than that under commitment. Firms anticipate
the wage increase in the second period and, as a consequence, are more reluctant to hire
for any given ﬁrst period wage. Second, the F-shift of wages along good spells modiﬁes the
objective function of the union which, under no-commitment, turns out to be a weighted
sum of the utility in the ﬁrst and in all subsequent periods. The main implication of this
change is the fact that the union is more willing to trade oﬀ al o w e r( ﬁrst period) wage
against higher employment.10
How large need to be F to prevent positive adjustments under no-commitment? Since
the union is more willing to exchange lower wages for higher employment, a suﬃcient
condition for Lnc
g >L nc
b is that labour demand 21 does not lie below labour demand 23:




Similar to equation 19, this inequality requires F not to be too large with respect to the
change in marginal productivity. Further, despite the condition appears to be more strin-
gent than that arising under commitment one can not conclude that positive adjustments
are less likely under no-commitment. Strictly speaking, the two conditions are not com-
parable since the restriction in 19 is necessary and suﬃcient while the restriction in 24 is
only suﬃcient.
T h ei m p a c to fﬁring costs on employment and wage ﬂuctuations is qualitatively similar
to what we have seen under commitment. An increase in ﬁring costs dampens the swings
in labour demand and reduces ﬂuctuations. By contrast, the impact of ﬁring costs on
employment and wage levels may be very diﬀerent when one compares the two equilibria.
We deal with this issue in the next section.








g and compute the marginal rate of substitution for the
t w oo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o n si n1 5a n d2 0 .
205 Comparing equilibria
The no-commitment equilibrium exhibits many elements that trace back to the classic
insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). The union increases the wage by the
whole amount of ﬁring costs after new workers have been hired. Firms, in turn, anticipate
the wage increase and recruit less workers for given ”entry” wages. Obviously, the union
is harmed by ﬁrms reluctance to hire and, if possible, it would promise not to exploit the
margins guaranteed by ﬁring costs. Yet, in the absence of a commitment device, subgame
perfection rules out any promise that does not result to be credible. Indeed, promising
wage moderation is not credible. After new workers have been hired, the union can safely
increase the wage by the amount F without paying any cost in terms of dismissed workers
and in terms of a deterioration in the continuation value.
However, in spite of the similarities with the insider-outsider theory, one can not im-
mediately conclude that the insider-outsider mechanism leads to a lower employment level
under no-commitment. For, in this case, ﬁring costs not only move labour demand down-
wards but also bend the shape of union indiﬀerence curves in the wnc
g -Lnc
g space (equation
20). In particular, F reduces the union marginal return from wnc
g and increases that from
Lnc
g leading to an incentive to exchange lower wages for higher employment. This induces
the union to counteract the negative impact of ﬁring costs on labour demand through low
wages. Thus, if ﬁring costs exert under no-commitment an extra negative employment
eﬀect which adds to the discounting and curvature eﬀects is ex-ante undetermined. To
establish whether the union fully neutralises the reluctance of ﬁrms to hiring through low
entry wages one needs to study the determination of Lnc
g and Lc
g in some more detail.
Solving for Lnc
g and Lc
g requires to compute the ﬁrst order condition from the cor-
responding programs and to combine these conditions with labour demand. Below, we
present the expressions that result from these manipulations where, for the sake of sim-
plicity, we have made two substitutions, a =
r+q
1+r and R = αg − dL:



















































Observe ﬁrst that if v were linear [v00 = 0], the two conditions would coincide and the
employment level would be the same no matter whether the union is able to commit or
not. This result stands in sharp contrast with the insider-outsider contention that the
opportunistic behaviour of workers always reduces the level of employment. Intuitively,
when the utility function is linear, the union is not concerned with the actual path of
wages but only with the discounted value from the whole wage ﬂow. Thus, the union does
not ﬁnd it costly to charge a particularly low wage in the ﬁrst period that completely
counteracts the reluctance of ﬁrms to hiring. The commitment outcome can be replicated
at no cost through a mechanism which is equivalent to paying in advance a bond which
equals the discounted ﬂow of rents that will accrue in future bargaining.
The class of functions in use, however, imply that v is concave with a positive third
derivative. In this case, by the Jensen’s inequality, the numerator on the RHS of the
ﬁrst expression is higher than the numerator of the second. By contrast, the denominator
is lower. This means that the RHS of the ﬁrst expression is always higher than that of
the second. Further, if one regards the RHSs of the two expressions as functions of R,
straightforward diﬀerentiation shows that the two RHSs increase and become closer as R
increases. In ﬁg u r e2w ed e p i c tt h eR H Sa n dt h eL H So ft h et w oe x p r e s s i o n sa sf u n c t i o n s
of R.
Notice that, in equilibrium, the marginal revenue R is lower under commitment. Thus,
we conclude that the employment level is higher under commitment, a result which is
consistent with the insider-outsider theory. By the same argument, since ﬁrms equate
the discounted ﬂow of marginal revenues to the discounted ﬂow of wages plus adjustment
costs, wages are on average lower under commitment.
What happens when the utility function is concave? Concavity implies aversion to-
wards anticipated sharp changes in the wage proﬁl eo ft h et y p et h a tt a k ep l a c ei nt h e
no-commitment case. Workers are harmed in that a ﬂat wage proﬁle with equal dis-
22Figure 1: Commitment vs. No-commitment
counted value is strictly preferred to the actual one, which presents an increase of size F
from the second period onwards.
This fact does not explain by itself the reasons for the union to choose a lower em-
ployment level, and higher wages, in the no-commitment case. It is not diﬃcult to see,
however, how this outcome results both from a lower return for the union from the em-
ployment level as well as from an higher return from the wage level. The wage shift of size
F from the ﬁrst to the second period reduces the utility of each single employed worker
and, henceforth, reduces the gain from being employed as opposed to being unemployed.
This means that the union faces a lower beneﬁt from having a large number of employed
workers. This eﬀect is captured by the numerators of the expressions above. On the other
hand, since the shift is ﬁxed in size it becomes relatively less harmful in terms of utility
if wages are particularly high. It follows that the union faces an higher return from a
wage increase. This eﬀect is captured by the denominator. Thus, both channels explain
why concavity leads to higher wages and lower employment levels in the no-commitment
case.11
In Table 1 we compute the employment eﬀect from an increase in ﬁring costs when
the utility function is isoelastic: v(w)=w1−γ
1−γ ,0< γ < 1. As γ increases utility becomes
11Modesto and Thomas (2001) show that the no-commitment equilibrium exhibits a lower employment
level even if they assume v
00 = 0. Their result, however, is driven by a diﬀerent mechanism deeply rooted
in the assumption of quadratic adjustment costs.
In contrast with linear costs, quadratic costs reduce the elasticity of labour demand in the short run but
not that in the long run. As a consequence, the union charges higher wages when it deals with the short
run labour demand, i.e. in the no-commitment case.
23Curvature γ =0 .1 γ =0 .5 γ =0 .7
Committment 0.01 0 0
Non-Committment 0.01 -3.8 -6
Table 1: Change in average employment (percent) if ﬁring costs increase from F=1 to F=5. Parameters:
αg =1 0 ,αb =6 ,q =0 .3, r =0 .02, d =2 ,w =4
more concave, i.e. individuals suﬀer more for given expected jumps in the wage path. In
the table we compute the proportional change in average employment Li =0 .5Li
g +0.5Li
b
i = c,nc due to an increase in ﬁring cost from F =1t oF =5 . 12
Observe that when the utility function is almost linear [γ =0 .1] the two equilibria
present the same variation in average employment. In spite of the absence of a commit-
ment, the union is capable of replicating (almost) the same employment outcome arising
under commitment. In addition, the overall employment eﬀect is positive but very small.
When the curvature increases, the insider-outsider mechanism becomes more eﬀective. We
notice that average employment decreases by 3.8% in the no-commitment equilibrium if
γ =0 .5a n db y6 %i fγ =0 .7. No employment reduction takes place in the commitment
equilibrium.
6 Empirical analysis
A summary of theoretical results
The model predicts that ﬁring costs exert an additional eﬀe c to ne m p l o y m e n t-o f
negative sign - when one compares the equilibrium under no-commitment with the one
under commitment. The reason is a classic hold up problem. Firing costs oﬀer workers
the opportunity of extracting high rents once they have been hired. Firms anticipate the
opportunistic behaviour of workers and refrain from hiring too much during an upturn.
Ex post, workers have no better choice than that of validating ﬁrms expectations.
In principle, ﬁrm reluctance to hiring could be overcome by particularly low entry
wages. Low entry wages, however, may turn out to be very costly in utility terms if
workers dislike sharp wage changes. That is, if they are risk averse and credit constrained.
12With F =5 ,ﬁring costs are slightly lower than the average wage arising in the no-commitment
equilibrium (with γ =0 .7 ) .I nh i g he m p l o y m e n tp r o t e c t i o nc o u n t r i e st h ea m o u n to fﬁr i n gc o s t si se s t i m a t e d
to be almost equal to the annual wage bill (OECD, 1994).
24Thus, in a world with risk aversion, credit market imperfections and with no-commitment,
ﬁring costs feed into wages and decrease employment below the level that would arise under
commitment.
This insider-outsider eﬀect adds to the employment impact of ﬁring cost under com-
mitment. The latter, however, is not clear-cut since it results from the combination of
two countervailing eﬀects, the discounting and the curvature eﬀect. Thus, the model does
not oﬀer any prediction on the overall employment impact of ﬁring costs but only on the
diﬀerential impact between commitment and no-commitment equilibria.
Empirical Implications
How do these results translate into empirically testable predictions? A major diﬃculty
in testing the model relates to ﬁnding information on long-term wage commitments. Ex-
plicit wage contracts are clearly short termed as these contracts usually span two or three
years for most bargain contexts and across all the economies. Relying on explicit contacts,
however, would be too restrictive since commitment-like equilibra can be also supported
by implicit contracts or through long term relationships based on trust.
Contrary to explicit contracts, implicit contracts cannot be enforced by third parties,
such as courts. Only the parties involved in the contract can determine whether the agree-
ment has been violated and, eventually, decide for actions intended to punish deviations.
Enforcement then typically involves the threat of interrupting cooperative relationships.
In the context of the present analysis, ﬁrms and workers could agree for a plan of actions
that replicate the commitment equilibrium with the understanding that ﬁrms revert to
the non-commitment strategies if workers should ever defect. Indeed, it is straightforward
to show that if the discount rate is suﬃciently small the union will never defect.
Agreements that are governed by implicit contracts are self-enforcing. By contrast,
relationships supported by trust are not self-enforcing since the party that trusts is, by
deﬁnition, vulnerable to opportunism but expects that the other party will not exploit
this vulnerability (James, 2002). Or, more in line with the theory of incentives, the party
that trusts is conﬁdent that the other party will not exploit vulnerability due to the
penalties that would otherwise be inﬂicted in some other dimension of social interactions
(Spagnolo, 1999). In our context, trust means that ﬁrms expect that workers do not
25exploit the protection guaranteed by ﬁring costs after they have been hired.
In the real world, the notions of trust and implicit contracts overlap with that of
cooperation. Indeed, James (2002) explains that implicit contracts and trust represent
t w ow a y st oo b t a i nap a r e t o - e ﬃcient cooperative solution in a prisoner dilemma context.
Thus, from the perspective of our model, we conjecture that an equilibrium similar to the
one under commitment tends to overlap with cooperative industrial relations whereas no-
commitment equilibria tend to be associated with adversarial relations. As a consequence,
we expect that coeteris paribus, the impact of ﬁr i n gc o s t so ne m p l o y m e n ti sl e s sn e g a t i v e
- or more positive - in contexts featuring more cooperative industrial relations. For this
reason, in the empirical analysis below we mainly focus on the interaction between em-
ployment protection and cooperation in industrial relations as a determinant of aggregate
unemployment.
Data
We test this prediction by exploiting time-series and cross-country variability in unem-
ployment, employment protection and quality of industrial relations. We use a panel that
includes 20 OECD countries observed for 15 years, from 1990 to 2004; annual data, how-
ever, have been averaged over 5-years periods in order to clear for short run movements13.
Information regarding the rate of unemployment and its determinants - inﬂation, un-
employment beneﬁts, labour taxation, employment protection, bargain institutions - is
the one provided by the OECD and largely used in the macro-labour empirical literature
(Nuziata 2003, for instance). Thus, given widespread use in former works, we do not give
any detail here and invite the interested reader to look at the data appendix for the exact
deﬁnition of variables and their source.
The OECD, however, does not provide systematic information on the climate of in-
dustrial relations for member countries. To ﬁll the gap we have resorted to the index of
”perceived” cooperation in industrial relations computed by the World Economic Forum
(WEF). This index is constructed by asking a panel of qualiﬁed operators to quantify over
a given scale the degree of cooperation in their country. For instance, in 1997 respon-
dents were asked to express their opinion on the sentence ”Labor-employer relations are
13This is the strategy adopted, among several others, by Nickell (1998), Belot and VanOurs (2004) and
Garibaldi and Violante (2005).
26Dependend variable: unemployment
Model II I I I I I V
Inﬂation(t) - Inﬂation(t-1) -.996* -.992 -1.001* -.990
(0.551) (0619) (0.552) (0.610)
Replacement Rate -.045* -.048 -.047* -.047*
(0.026) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026)
Labour Taxation .128** .118** .130** .118**
(0.041) (0.049) (0.041) (0.049)
Centralisation .751** .820** .768** .813**
(0.343) (0.356) (0.331) (0.343)
Epl .096 .262 0.192 .225
(0.779) (0.841) (0.553) (0.584)
Coop -.218 .083
(0.751) (0.886)
Inter. Epl-Coop -.680* -.646* -.772** -.730**
(0.397) (0.423) (0.148) (0.149)
Union controls No Yes No Yes
Rsq. 0.56 .56 .56 .56
N r . O b s . 6 06 06 06 0
Table 2: Robust standard errors in parentesis; ** 5% signiﬁcance, * 10% signiﬁcance.
generally cooperative” (answers: 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
Due to the subjective nature of these answers doubts may arise regarding the reliability
of the index. This issue, however, has been already addressed by Blanchard and Philippon
(2004), who conclude that the index is a good approximation for an ideal objective measure
in light of the high correlation with lagged measures of strike activity. The WEF index is
available annually for a large number of countries since 1985. However, the wording of the
question asked by the interviewers has changed over time, especially in early years. Thus,
to preserve a certain degree of uniformity, we have decided to drop observations for years
1985-1989. This explains the reason for our dataset to begin with the year 1990.
Finally, for the purpose of estimation, a weakness of the WEF indicator is the small
degree of variability. To get around this problem we have re-scaled the index over a
4-points array (0,1,2,3) by using quartile thresholds.
Estimation
Empirical ﬁndings are summarised in table 2. In model I we regress unemployment
on a traditional ”Phillips curve” set of regressors plus regressors that represent our focus
27variables: the EPL index, the WEF index of cooperation (Coop) and their interaction.
In model II we add a set of union controls: coverage, density and coordination. Observe
that most coeﬃcients are of expected sign. Unemployment decreases with respect to the
acceleration in inﬂation and increases with respect to labour taxation and the degree of
centralisation in wage bargaining. Contrary to expectations, the impact from unemploy-
ment beneﬁts (replacement rate) is negative (but not in model II). More importantly, the
strictness of employment protection and the degree of cooperation in industrial relations
do not aﬀect unemployment but the interaction between them reduces unemployment,
albeit only at a 10% signiﬁcance level. Since the cooperation index is not signiﬁcant nor it
plays any autonomous role in the theoretical model, we exclude it in speciﬁcations III and
IV. These represent our preferred estimations since the exclusion increases the signiﬁcance
of the negative interaction coeﬃcient.
Although we have not dealt with issues of endogeneity, we believe that these results are
consistent with the view that the employment eﬀect of worker protection is determined by
the industrial relations environment. Taken at their face value, point estimates imply that
a unit increase in the EPL index reduces unemployment by (0.75·Coop) percentage points.
This means that in countries with adversarial relations (Coop = 0) EPL does not exert
any appreciable impact on unemployment whereas, in countries with highly cooperative
relations (Coop = 3), a point increase in EPL reduces unemployment by more than 2%.
7 Concluding remarks
In spite of the large attention over the last two decades, there is still a lack of consensus
regarding the employment impact of mandated job protection. In models of dynamic
labour demand with ﬁxed wages - Bertola and Bentolila (1990), for instance - ﬁring costs
reduce workforce turnover but have an ambiguous impact on the level of employment. By
contrast, the traditional insider-outsider theory - Lindbeck and Snower (1988) - suggests
that wages represent an important channel for the overall employment impact of Epl. In
particular, high ﬁring costs strengthen the bargaining position of insiders and lead, as
a consequence, to higher wages and lower employment. General equilibrium extensions
conﬁrm that the reaction of wages to ﬁring costs is crucial for the overall employment eﬀect
of these costs. Empirical ﬁndings are also controversial. In the works of Lazear (1990)
28and Djankov et al. (2003), for instance, dismissal regulations increase unemployment. By
contrast, Bertola (1990), the OECD (1999) and others ﬁnd that aggregate employment
levels are not aﬀected by the stringency of legal provisions.
In this paper we oﬀer new theoretical insights on the issue and show that the rela-
tionship between ﬁring costs and employment is crucially inﬂuenced by the existence of a
commitment on future wages. Under commitment, the relationship can have either sign
depending on the discount rate, on the volatility of business conditions and on worker
preferences over diﬀerent wage and employment bundles. Under no commitment, ﬁring
costs add an extra eﬀect of negative sign due to higher wages.
These results suggest that previous theoretical work has disregarded a potentially
relevant interaction between Epl and those features of the wage bargaining process that
determine whether workers can commit over future wages. A major implication is that
employment protection combines with the quality of industrial relation in determining the
rate of unemployment. Following an increase in Epl, unemployment tends to increase less
(or decrease more) in contexts characterised by more cooperative industrial relations.
This prediction proves to be consistent with the evidence from 20 OECD countries
observed over the 1990-2004 period. The interaction term between Epl and the index
of cooperation turns out to aﬀect unemployment with a negative sign implying that Epl
is neutral for unemployment in adversarial contexts but decreases unemployment with
cooperation.
A further implication of the model that has not been explored in this paper concerns
the interaction between employment protection and the eﬃciency of credit markets. Well
functioning credit markets favour consumption smoothing. In turn, improved smoothing
translates, in reduced form, into a less concave worker utility. Finally, lower concavity
implies that the equilibrium under no-commitment tends to replicate the employment
sequences that obtains under commitment. An empirical test of this prediction is left to
future research.
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The ﬁrst order conditions for problem 10-11 are:
wt: − (Σt + Λt)+Uw(wt,L t)=0 ( A1)
























t (Lt − Lt−1)=0 ( A5)
The Euler conditions are:










To obtains the constraints 6 and 7 which arise under positive ﬁring and hiring, run
forward equations A6a n dA7, impose asymptotic convergence and substitute respectively
in A3a n dA4. Equation A5 gives the constraint 8. Thus, equations A3-A7 reproduce the
program constraints.
Equation A1 governs the dynamics of wages while equations A2a n dA8 regulate the
dynamics of employment. Notice that by combining A2a n dA8 one obtains a stochastic
dynamic equation:
γtII









The equilibrium under commitment
Lemma 1 In the commitment equilibrium, if Lt = Lt−1 then wt = wt−1.
Proof
Lt = Lt−1 means inaction at time t. Inaction, in turn, is only possible if the wage wt
lies in the interval [wt, wt]. In this interval the hiring and ﬁring constraints 6-7 are not
’active’, i.e. IF
t = IH
t = 0. As a consequence, by equation 10, Σt = Σt−1 and Λt = Λt−1.
In turn, by equation A1:
Uw(wt,L t)=Uw(wt−1,L t−1)
33Finally, the latter implies that Lt = Lt−1 is only possible if wt = wt−1.◦
Lemma 2 In the commitment equilibrium, if Lt 6= Lt−1 then
UL(wt,L t)=dUw(wt,L t)( A10)
Proof
Multiply both sides of equation A9b yII
t and notice that (II
t )2 = II














t+i [UL(wt−1,L t−1) − dUw(wt−1,L t−1)]
)
(A11)




t+i is equal to 1
only if employment remains constant from t − 1t ot + j and 0 otherwise. By lemma 1,
constant employment implies constant wages. Thus the wage is also ﬁxed at level wt−1.
As a consequence of constant employment and wages, equation A11 can be rewritten as
follows:
γtII













Finally, use the latter in equation A9:
γtII








If employment changes at time t,t h e nII
t = 0 so that equation A10 follows immediately
from equation A12. ◦
Lemma 3 In the commitment equilibrium, αt = αt−1 and employment inaction at
t − 1 imply employment inaction at t.
Proof
Inaction at time t − 1m e a n sLt−1 = Lt−2 and, as noticed in the proof of Lemma 1,
Σt−1 = Σt−2 and Λt−1 = Λt−2.T h u s ,i fαt = αt−1, it follows immediately Yt = Yt−1. Lt
is equal to Lt−1 since L(Yt)=L(Yt−1).◦
Proposition A1
In the commitment equilibrium, if αt = αt−1 then Lt = Lt−1.
Proof
Here it is only proved by contradiction that Lt >L t−1 and αt = αt−1 can not be part
of an equilibrium. The proof for Lt <L t−1 is similar and, henceforth, omitted.
Suppose that Lt >L t−1 with αt = αt−1. Lemma 3 dictates Lt−1 6= Lt−2,i nf a c t
αt = αt−1 and Lt−1 = Lt−2 would imply Lt = Lt−1. Thus, by lemma 2, the equality in
34A10 holds both at t − 1a n dt. In turn, equation A10 and Lt >L t−1 imply
wt >w t−1 (A13)
Next, use equation 2 to subtract labour demand at time t−1 from labour demand at time
t:
wt − wt−1 =( αt − αt−1) − d(Lt − Lt−1) − (St − St−1)+1 /(1 + r)(EtSt+1 − Et−1St)
The inequality Lt >L t−1 implies St ≥ St−1 since St−1 ∈ [−F,0] and St =0 .F u r t h e r -
more, the inequality implies EtSt+1 ≤ Et−1St since inheriting an higher employment level
does not increase the expected shadow value of labour. Putting together these results with
the equality αt = αt−1 it easy to see that above equation requires
wt <w t−1 (A14)
Inequalities in A14 and A13 are contradictory.◦
Proposition A2
If r =0a n dv(w) is CARA, isoelastic or logaritmic then average employment decreases
with F.
Proof






j) − v(e w)
v0(wc
j)
= Xj j = g,b Xg = αg − qF Xb = αb + qF
Since labour demand is linear and F enters symmetrically in the two schedules (with
r = 0), an increase in F does not aﬀect average employment for a given average wage.
Thus, average employment decreases only if the average wage increases as a consequence of
higher ﬁring costs. In turn, the average wage increases with F by the Jensen’s inequality
if G−1(X) is concave or, equivalently, if G(w)i sc o n v e x .
Deﬁne e v = v(e w)a n dΘ = −v00/v0 and compute the ﬁrst derivative of G(w):
G0 =1+
(v0)
2 − v00(v − e v)
(v0)
2 =2+Θ
v − e v
v0 > 0
If v is CARA, the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion Θ is constant; G00 is positive as
(v − v)/v0 is increasing with respect to w.N e x t , i f v is isoelastic, Θ/v0 is proportional
to 1/v since wΘ is constant and wv0 is proportional to v; G00 is positive as (v − v)/v is
increasing. Finally, if v is logaritmic, Θ/v0 =1 ;G00 is positive as v − v is increasing.◦
The equilibrium under no-commitment
Lemma 4 In the no-commitment equilibrium, if Lt = Lt−1 then wt = w(αt,L t−1).
35Proof
Under no-commitment - Σt−1 + Λt−1 = 0 - the union program 11 becomes
W(αt,L t−1)= m a x
wt,L t, σt, λt, γt
U(wt,L t)+( σtIH
t + λtIF
t )(αt − dLt − wt)+
+λtIF
t F + γtII




If in state (αt,L t−1) the union chooses a wage wt such that employment does not
change from the previous level, i.e. σtIH
t = λtIF
t =0a n dLt−1 = Lt, the discounted ﬂow





The wage wt appears only in the utility function U. Thus, the union has no incentive
to choose a wage below the maximum consistent with inaction.◦
Lemma 5 In the no-commitment equilibrium, the value for the union of lagged em-



















t+i [UL(w,Lt−1) − dUw(w,Lt−1)]
)
=
= B [UL(w,Lt−1) − dUw(w,Lt−1)]
Diﬀerentiate γtII







ULL − 2dUwL + d2Uww
¤
(A16)
Equation A15 is true since ULL − 2dUwL + d2Uww < 0.◦
Lemma 6 In the no-commitment equilibrium, if αt = αt−1, employment inaction at
time t − 1 implies employment inaction at time t.
Proof
Equalities αt = αt−1 and Lt−1 = Lt−2 imply that state vectors at the beginning of
periods t and t − 1 are the same. As a result, the wage chosen by the union and the
employment level are the same.◦
Proposition 3A
In the no-commitment equilibrium, if αt = αt−1 then Lt = Lt−1.
Proof
36Here it is only proved by contradiction that Lt >L t−1 and αt = αt−1 can not be part
of an equilibrium. The proof for Lt <L t−1 is similar and, henceforth, omitted.
Thus, suppose that Lt >L t−1 and αt = αt−1. As in the proof of proposition A1,
consistency with the optimal behaviour of ﬁrms requires
wt <w t−1 (A17)
Next, consider the union optimal behaviour. The inequality Lt >L t−1 implies γtII
t =0 .
Further, by lemma 6, Lt−1 6= Lt−2 and, as a consequence, γt−1II
t−1 = 0. Use these results
in equation A9:






















= 0 can be though of as an implicit functions of




dUwL − ULL − 1
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Thus, Lt >L t−1 implies
wt >w t−1 (A18)
Equations A17 and A18 are contradictory.◦
Lemma 7
In a no-commitment equilibrium,
a) for spells that start with hiring, the wage increases by F in the second period and
remains constant until the end of the spell.
b) for spells that start with ﬁring, the wage is constant throughout the spell.
Proof
a) Suppose that in state (αt,L t−1) a new spell starts and suppose that the spell starts
with hiring. Further, suppose that the spell lasts for at least two periods: αt = αt+1.
Finally, notice that under no-commitment the shadow value S(αt,w t,L t−1)c a nb ew r i t t e n
as S(αt,L t−1)s i n c ewt = w(αt,L t−1).
As the spell starts with hiring at time t, the shadow value of labour is S(αt,L t−1)=0 .
By contrast, Proposition 3A and Lemma 4 imply that at time t +1S(αt+1,L t)=−F.
Use these results in equation 2 and derive labour demand at t and t +1 :








37Observe that: 1) by assumption αt+1 = αt, 2) by proposition 3A L(αt+1,L t)=
L(αt,L t−1) and 3) by the Markov property Et [S(αt+1,L t)] = Et+1 [S(αt+2,L t+1)]. Use
these equalities and subtract the ﬁrst from the second equation:
w(αt+1,L t)=w(αt,L t−1)+F
Notice that, it the spell continues in period t+2,i.e. αt+1 = αt+2, it is easy to see that
w(αt+2,L t+1)=w(αt+1,L t). By induction, this implies that, once the wage has increased
at t + 1, it remains constant until the end of the spell.
b) For spells that start with ﬁring, the shadow value lies on the ﬁring barrier in the
ﬁrst and in all other periods. Proving part b) is straightforward.◦
38Data appendix
Unemployment Source: OECD, Standardised Unemployment Rates, Quarterly Labour
Force Statistics, Economic Outlook 2000 and 2005;
Inﬂation Deﬁnition: Annual Change in the GDP Deﬂator; Source: OECD, Economic
Outlook 2006 (1), 2004 (1), 1999 (1).
Cooperative Industrial Relations (index) Source: World Economic Forum, Global
Competitiveness Report from the 1996 issue to the 2004-5 issue and World Compet-
itiveness Report from the 1990 issue to the 2005 issue. Note:e v e ni ft h ew o r d i n go f
the question has changed from time to time, in all years but 1996 (omitted) the pur-
pose of the question has been that of assessing the degree of cooperation in industrial
relations. The index ranges between 1 and 7 as respondents are required to report
1 in case of ID ”generally confrontational” and 7 if ID are ”generally cooperative”.
Tax Wedge Deﬁnition: Income tax plus employee and employer contributions (as a %
of the labour costs), single person without children. Source: OECD, Taxing Wages
2004/2005, Table D.1 pag.448.
Replacement Rate Deﬁnition: weighted average of the gross unemployment beneﬁt
replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations
of unemployment. Source:O E C D ,T a x - B e n e ﬁts models, OECD website. Note:t h e
information provided by the OECD does not cover all years between 1990 and 2004.
Thus, for the 1990-94 period we have averaged data referred to 1991 and 1993, for
1995-1999 we have averaged data referred to 1995, 1997 and 1999 and, ﬁnally, for
2000-2004 we have averaged data referred to 2001 and 2003.
EPL index Deﬁnition: summary index for the stringency of legal restrictions to the free-
dom of hiring and ﬁring permanent as well as temporary workers. Source:O E C D ,
Employment Outlook 2004 chap. 2. Note: the OECD computes 2 Epl indexes.
Index 1 does not account for cross-countries heterogeneity in collective dismissals
regulations while index 2 does. On the other hand, index 1 has been computed in
1990, 1998 and 2003 while index 2 has only been computed in 1998 and 2003. For
this reason we use index 1 in our estimation.
Centralisation, Density, Coverage, Coordination Source: OECD, Employment Out-
look 2004 ch. 3
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